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CHAPTER ONE: A WAR OF PREEMPTION
The world changed after 9/11. American foreign policy was forced to take a more
aggressive stance against potential threats throughout the world. By implementing the
Bush doctrine, President George W. Bush sought to reform American foreign policy by
waging a preventive war against terrorism and the countries that harbored terrorists.
After 9/11 the primary target of the United States was Afghanistan where the Taliban
ruled and those responsible for the terrorist attacks were located. By waging war in
Afghanistan the Bush administration launched a full assault against terrorism in order to
ensure the safety of the United States. Besides Afghanistan, Iraq was another country
high on the administration’s priority list due to possible ties to terrorism as well as the
potential threat of weapons of mass destruction.
The Bush administration identified Iraq as one of the biggest threats to the United
States because of the previous history between the two countries. The dictatorship of
Saddam Hussein represented a major threat to the United States due to its potential for
WMD along with Saddam Hussein’s prior use of chemical weapons. The WMD being
addressed consist of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. While all three are their
own separate entity, they can all be considered as WMD. Aside from its potential
capability of WMD, Iraq also held a strategic position in the Middle East economically
and militarily. From a diplomatic standpoint, there were many reasons why the Bush
administration chose to invade Iraq in March 2003, however none was so great as the
possibility of Saddam Hussein wielding the power of nuclear weapons.
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In a post-9/11 era, the Bush administration knew that it could not take any risks
nor rule out any possibilities. However, the Bush administration could not launch an
invasion of Iraq based on pure speculation. For this reason extensive research was
carried out to determine the extent of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons program. In
order to conduct an invasion of Iraq and overthrow its government, the Bush
administration needed solid evidence to support its claims. The intelligence gathered by
the Intelligence Community leading up to the March 2003 invasion proved to be the
deciding factor in whether or not the United States invaded Iraq. Based on the research
gathered, the Bush administration concluded that it should launch an invasion of Iraq as a
means of preventive war. The Bush administration justified the invasion of Iraq in 2003
by saying that there was strong intelligence pointing to the existence of WMD stockpiles.
Furthermore, the biggest motivation for the invasion was rooted in the possibility that
Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons. If Saddam Hussein did not already
possess nuclear weapons, there was a strong possibility that he would in the coming
years. This is significant in relation to the Bush administration’s motives because after
the invasion of Iraq no WMD were actually found, spurring the notion that the main
reason for invasion was nonexistent. This led many people to believe that there was a
failure of intelligence going into the war and that possibly the Bush administration had
ulterior motives for waging war in Iraq. However, the fact that no WMD were found
after the U.S. invasion does not mean that they never existed. There is the possibility that
any evidence or material relating to WMD in Iraq was either destroyed or it still has not
been found. Saddam Hussein’s refusal to cooperate with weapons inspections and United
Nations Security Resolutions over the years left many officials skeptical about whether or
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not he had something to hide from the rest of the world. Either Saddam Hussein did have
WMD that he needed to keep hidden, or he wanted people to believe that he had WMD
for the security of Iraq against other nations. Many people thought that Saddam Hussein
did have chemical and biological weapons and he was in the process of developing a
nuclear weapons program. Nevertheless, the intelligence played an integral part in the
decision for the United States to invade Iraq and therefore the accuracy of the intelligence
leading up to the war was the deciding factor in whether or not the Bush administration
would make a well-informed decision.
Regarding the intelligence going into the war in Iraq, several possibilities exist.
One possibility is that the intelligence was accurate and the Bush administration
interpreted it properly. This possibility implies that the Intelligence Community and the
Bush administration acted appropriately in carrying out their duty. The second
possibility is that the intelligence was gathered properly and it was unbiased; however,
the Bush administration interpreted it in a manner that would support its motive to go to
war. The final possibility is that the Intelligence Community did not properly gather
intelligence because it received pressure from the Bush administration to attain a certain
result. If this assumption were true, both the Intelligence Community and the Bush
administration would be at fault because the intelligence was gathered in a manner that
would produce a certain result and also the Bush administration influenced the
intelligence without any regard for the actual truth but instead for the sake of creating a
cause for war. The problem one must confront is determining which one of these
possibilities is most likely the truth. If the Bush administration decided to invade Iraq
because there was solid intelligence that supported the existence of WMD in Iraq, then
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the United States’ reason of protecting itself from WMD in the hands of a dictator would
have been justified. Many believe that for the sake of national security, the possibility of
an attack was reason alone to take action. However, if the Bush administration
influenced the gathering of intelligence in order to produce a biased result that supported
the existence of WMD, then the war in Iraq would have been conducted under false
pretenses and the motivation for war, which was given to the American people, and the
rest of the world would not have been legitimate.
The Iraq War was conducted as a means of prevention. President Bush, in his war
ultimatum on March 18, 2003 stated “The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or,
one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their
stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our
country, or any other.”1 One belief is that it was unfinished business from the previous
Gulf War and the Bush administration felt that it was in the best interest of the United
States to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Following 9/11 the Bush administration
took the offensive in waging a war on terrorism and Iraq was included in this offensive.
However the primary reason for war that was presented to the American people was the
belief that Saddam Hussein had WMD stockpiles. The question that must be asked is
whether or not the Bush administration had the right to tell the public that the reason for
waging war was the existence of WMD in Iraq. To answer this question one must
explore the content of the intelligence as well as how it was used to fully understand the
magnitude of the situation.

1

John Ehrenberg and eds. The Iraq Papers, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004),
110-113.
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When examining the intelligence that was gathered going into the Iraq War, one
must consider every possibility when forming an opinion. Due to the fact that the war in
Iraq has only recently ended and that the United States still maintains a presence in the
country, it has not been long enough to know all of the facts. When gathering
intelligence regarding WMD one cannot expect to have all of the information readily
accessible. This is especially true in the case of Iraq where a dictator like Saddam
Hussein refused to cooperate with weapons resolutions for years. However, we must
hope that based on the intelligence that we do have, officials are confident in the
decisions they make. In the case of Iraq, we must hope that officials in the Bush
administration considered all of the intelligence and weighed all of the options
dispassionately before arriving at the decision to go to war. If this is not the case and
instead there was a failure of intelligence or the Bush administration used the intelligence
in a way that would support its motives, then allegations of WMD in Iraq were fabricated
to gain the support of the American people. On the other hand, in a post-9/11 era, the
Bush administration might have felt that it could not take any chances and even the
smallest inkling of a nuclear threat deserved the administration’s undivided attention
along with preventive military action. After taking this into consideration, one can
determine whether or not the potential existence of WMD in Iraq was a legitimate reason
to go to war.
Critics of President Bush’s decision to go to war in Iraq make the following
argument. While the war in Iraq may have been a preemptive war in the best interest of
the national security of the United States, the reasons for war were exaggerated due to an
intelligence failure and the misrepresentation of intelligence by the Bush administration.

5

The Bush administration did not want to risk the threat of Saddam Hussein’s growing
WMD program and therefore it took preemptive action by launching an invasion of Iraq
and removing Saddam Hussein from power. While this action may have been perceived
to be in the best interest of national security, it was carried out under the notion that Iraq
had ties to terrorism as well as WMD. The problem lies in the fact that the Bush
administration did not have sufficient evidence to make these claims to the public as
justification for going to war. While the existence of WMD was the primary issue in
regards to Iraq, the Intelligence Community did not provide conclusive evidence to
support this claim. Furthermore, the Bush administration failed in the sense that it
presented the intelligence to the public in a way that would support its motives.
Following the Gulf War of 1991, Saddam Hussein repeatedly ignored UN Security
Council Resolutions 687 and 1441 as well as mandated UN weapons inspections intended
to ensure that Saddam Hussein was not reconstituting his weapons programs. Due to the
fact that Saddam Hussein refused to cooperate with the rest of the world and he had
already used chemical weapons in the past, the Bush administration was left to believe
that he had something to hide and that he posed an imminent threat to the United States
as well as the rest of the world. The decision to invade Iraq in 2003 can be attributed to
the Bush Doctrine and the plan to take preemptive action against any nation that harbors
terrorism or poses a serious threat to the United States. However the 2003 invasion
cannot be attributed to solid evidence of Iraq’s possession of WMD. While some
intelligence does exist that Saddam Hussein did have the potential for WMD and he did
have possible ties to terrorists, this intelligence was not formidable enough for it to be
presented to the American people as a justification for war.
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The president’s defenders respond that the situation can be viewed from another
perspective. Due to Saddam Hussein’s constant refusal to comply with weapons
resolutions or weapons inspections, many were left to believe that he had something to
hide. Instead of risking the possibility that Saddam Hussein did have weapons stockpiles
and not taking action, the Bush administration decided that for the sake of national
security it had to remove the dictator from power because of even the smallest possibility
that WMD were present in Iraq. There was some knowledge of chemical and biological
weapons programs in Saddam Hussein’s arsenal, and he had already used chemical
weapons in the past. While the intelligence may have been weak regarding the presence
of WMD stockpiles in Iraq, the Bush administration felt that it was better to be safe than
sorry. In many ways the Bush administration misled the public by saying it had strong
evidence of the existence of WMD; however, it was doing so for the greater good of
national security because it did not want to risk another tragedy. Furthermore, even
though we never located any kind of nuclear weapons program or WMD, the possibility
still remains that they did exist or there was some level of development however they
were either destroyed before we could get to them or they were transported out of the
country or they are still hidden. There are many reasons why the Bush administration
wanted to go to war in Iraq. However the existence of WMD was the one reason that
would win the approval of the American people along with the rest of the world and
make the war appear justified. For the sake of foreign policy and national security,
regime change in Iraq was in the best interest of the United States.
To understand the course of events leading up to the 2003 war in Iraq as well as
how the intelligence was gathered to arrive at the decision one must look at how officials
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use intelligence as a means of conducting foreign policy, at the intelligence that supports
the Bush administration’s decision to go to war based on the existence of WMD, and at
evidence of misinterpretation and failed intelligence which was used to support
allegations of WMD and give cause for war. These three things provide the necessary
information for one to decide whether or not the potential existence of WMD was a
legitimate reason for the Bush administration to give to the American people as a reason
for war.
I will begin with an overview of the president’s role in conducting foreign policy.
This will provide information on National Intelligence Estimates, which are given high
consideration when making decisions, and how presidents can take certain actions to
politicize intelligence. From there I will look at the actual intelligence that supported the
existence of WMD as well as the Bush administration’s case for why WMD were present
in Iraq. This can be found in the National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002,
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the United Nations in February 2003,
President Bush’s speech in Cincinnati in October 2002. After examining intelligence that
supported the Bush administration’s claims, I will then identify areas in which there was
a failure of intelligence. Here I will draw on several sources including the Senate Select
Committees June 2003 report, The Iraq Survey Group Final Report, the personal account
of George Tenet, and the personal account of Ambassador Joseph Wilson.
Prior to the war the Bush administration made the situation appear as if WMD
were in Iraq and the United States needed to confront the threat they posed to national
security. The Bush administration based this on intelligence that they claimed was
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conclusive. The fact of the matter is that the intelligence was not conclusive and there is
a great deal of evidence and personal accounts from top officials that prove this.

9

CHAPTER TWO: THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT AND INTELLIGENCE IN
CONDUCTING FOREIGN POLICY
In order to understand how the intelligence was gathered and how it was used by
the Bush administration in the context of the Iraq War of 2003, one must first understand
the general process of how intelligence should be used by the President and his officials
when conducting foreign policy. There are many ways to interpret intelligence and this
can have a serious effect on the manner in which foreign policy is carried out. When it
comes to foreign policy, the President has the final say in what action the United States is
going to take. However this does not mean that the President makes his decisions alone.
In almost every decision, the President consults with his closest advisors, known as
“senior” and “junior” participants.2 He does this so he can make the most informed
decision possible in the best interest of the United States. In the case of intelligence, the
President relies on the Director of Intelligence along with people from the State
Department and Defense Department to produce national intelligence estimates.3
Presidents rely on National Intelligence Estimates to make important decisions. In fact,
the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate was the primary piece of evidence for
the President’s conclusion that there were WMD in Iraq. This brings up the subject of
how the President and his participants should use intelligence. Intelligence can be very
useful to a President in providing him with valuable information about a current
international situation. However, intelligence in many regards is just information and it
should not be misconstrued as facts. The President and his participants are supposed to
2

Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign
Policy, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 16
3
Ibid, 17
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use intelligence as an aid to help them make foreign policy decisions. However, the
President should never use intelligence to his advantage by interpreting it in a way that
might supplement his own administration’s personal agenda. When conducting foreign
policy it is imperative that the President and his participants treat intelligence as raw,
unbiased information that may not be completely factual.
When conducting foreign policy, the President and the rest of his participants
form foreign policy objectives that they feel are in the best interest of the United States.
However in order to decide whether these objectives are feasible or even valid, extensive
analysis is carried out. Through analysis the President and his participants can rule out
any possible flaws to their objectives. “When an analysis or a set of arguments
substantially reduces the range of uncertainty and unambiguously points to the
desirability of a particular stand, that position is likely to be adopted by most, if not all,
participants.”4 Based on this reasoning, effective analysis provides decision makers with
valuable information, which they can use to make sound judgment and rule out any
unlikely alternatives. In the case of the war in Iraq, the Bush administration believed that
Saddam Hussein had WMD. However, it was only after the Intelligence Community
performed in-depth analysis on the matter that the Bush administration decided it was
likely. More importantly, the Bush administration labeled Iraq as a potential nuclear
threat within the next decade and the Intelligence Community confirmed this notion.
However, the manner in which the Intelligence Community conducted its analysis and
the way the Bush administration interpreted it remains a problem.

4

Ibid, 20
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Many times, and especially in the case of Iraq, actions of foreign policy may
receive strict scrutiny from the public. As a way to persuade the public and gain its
favor, a President might present his decision from a slightly different angle even though it
might not be the exact reasoning behind the decision.5 Regarding the war in Iraq, one
argument is that President Bush told the public that there was strong evidence for WMD
in Iraq because he knew that this would gain the public’s approval for going to war. If
this happens to be the case, and President Bush oversold the data, there is an ethical
dilemma in which President Bush misled the public, regardless of the fact that the
invasion of Iraq might have been in the best interest of the United States. When
gathering intelligence, the job of the analyst is to gather as much information on the
subject as possible without attempting to slant the information in any way. From there it
is up to the policymakers to interpret the intelligence so they can make informed
decisions. In no way should an analyst attempt to draw conclusions from the intelligence
because doing so would create a biased analysis. It is also the responsibility of the
policymakers such as the President to respect all of the intelligence for what it’s worth
without using it for the sole purpose of perpetuating an agenda. The intelligence should
not be misinterpreted to support foreign policy decisions but rather foreign policy
decisions should be made based on solid intelligence. In the Iraq War one intelligence
officer believed that the Bush administration “politicized” the intelligence in order for it
to fit the administration’s intentions of removing Saddam Hussein.6 Unfortunately
politicization of intelligence happens a great deal and it is only one of the ways in which
an administration can take advantage of intelligence.
5
6
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The Intelligence Community as well as the President can make many maneuvers
to try to affect the intelligence in a way that will depict a particular situation in a certain
way. One maneuver a policymaker might employ is to report information that only
supports his or her stand.7 By ignoring particular facts about a situation a policymaker
can make his or her particular stance appear to be much stronger than it actually is.8 In
particular, the intelligence community in Iraq continued to concentrate its analysis on
certain areas and as a result the same analysis continued to be reported.9 Another
maneuver is to arrange information in a way that will keep people from seeing certain
information.10 By hiding specific information one can easily influence the perspective
one might take on any particular subject. Furthermore, one can utilize people who he or
she knows will provide a particular result.11 In this way a policymaker can be sure that
the analysis will convey the information exactly how he or she wishes. It is obvious that
there are numerous methods to try to skew intelligence in a way that will support one’s
position. However, the fact of the matter is that all of these strategies are wrong and in
many ways unethical. The gathering of intelligence should always be carried out in an
unbiased fashion in which all of the facts are presented equally. From there the President
and his administration should use the intelligence to make a logical decision. Because it
is so easy to interpret intelligence in a way that might support one’s position, the misuse
of intelligence goes on all the time. However in the context of the invasion of a nation
and a full-scale war in which the trust of the public and hundreds of thousands of lives
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Ibid, 164
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are at stake, it is imperative that the intelligence process is carried out correctly from the
point of view of both the President as well as the entire Intelligence Community.
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CHAPTER THREE: INTELLIGENCE OF WMD AND THE CASE FOR WAR
While the Bush administration has received a great deal of scrutiny for allegedly
conducting the Iraq war under false pretenses, there is evidence that supports the
administration’s decision to invade Iraq. From the outset, the reasoning behind possible
military action in Iraq was preemption. Based on the reformed National Security
Strategy of the United States in September, 2002, also known as the Bush Doctrine, the
United States was going to take a preemptive strategy against terrorism as well as any
nation that harbors terrorists or any nation that might provide terrorists with WMD. This
new national security strategy adopted by the Bush administration was revolutionary in
the sense that it abandoned any previous strategy of containment or defense and justified
an offensive against enemies of the United States. This new strategy came about largely
after the tragedies of 9/11 when the Bush administration realized that it needed to take a
tougher stance against any nation or group that posed a threat to the United States. The
Bush administration’s argument was that if it hesitated to take action against any threats
the consequence might be the destruction of an entire American city.12 This created a
sense of urgency within the administration. When addressing WMD, the Bush Doctrine
states “The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD
compels us to action…The United States has long maintained the options of preemptive
actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security…the United States will, if
necessary, act preemptively.”13 Based on this newly adopted security strategy, the Bush
administration identified Iraq as a threat to the United States and a possible target of
12

Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade
Iraq (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 132.
13
U.S. President Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America September 2002.” Code of Federal Regulations, title3, pp.1-31 (2002).
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preemptive action due to the possibility that it might use WMD or provide them to
terrorists. Whether or not Iraq possessed WMD at the time was not as important as the
potential threat that Iraq posed to U.S. national security.
The argument can be made that based on its new strategy the Bush administration
could have targeted other nations with weapons of mass destruction such as North Korea
or Iran. However the focus was on Iraq due to the fact that the United States had trouble
dealing with Saddam Hussein ever since the first Gulf War, Saddam Hussein repeatedly
refused to comply with UN regulations, and Saddam Hussein had used chemical weapons
in the past. The thought of nuclear weapons in the hands of Saddam Hussein was
terrifying to the Bush administration and it wanted to avoid this at all costs. There were
several claims regarding Saddam Hussein’s nuclear capacity leading up to the war and
whether or not he actually had nuclear weapons, however, the thought that he could
possibly be developing nuclear weapons was reason enough for the Bush administration
to get rid of him for the sake of national security.14 Even though Iraq posed a threat to
the United States and its allies, the Bush administration could not conduct war on a whim
and it could not justify war without any intelligence to support it. Ideally, the situation in
Iraq would be handled diplomatically and military intervention would be used as a last
resort. While regime change in Iraq may have been in the best interest of U.S. national
security at the time, the Bush administration had to investigate all the possible scenarios
and gather as much intelligence as possible before making any snap judgments.
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James P. Pfiffner and Mark Phythian, Intelligence and National Security
Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives (Texas A&M University:
Manchester University Press, 2008) 62.
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The Intelligence Community conducted a huge process of intelligence gathering
on Iraq in order to find as much as possible about Saddam Hussein’s weapons programs
and the extent to which they posed a serious threat to U.S. national security. One of the
main pieces of intelligence that supported Saddam Hussein’s possession of WMD was
the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of October 2002. To gain further understanding
of the extent of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear capabilities, the Bush administration instructed
the Intelligence Community to come up with an NIE on the subject. The October 2002
NIE was largely conclusive in the existence of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq
as well as the continuing development of WMD.15 The NIE also concluded that the
completion of Iraq’s first nuclear weapon was contingent upon how quickly it acquired
weapons-grade fissile material.16 The NIE reported that once Iraq had weapons-grade
fissile material, it “could make a nuclear weapon within a year.”17 From the very
beginning of the NIE it is evident that based on whatever intelligence it had, the
Intelligence Community had reason to believe that Iraq’s potential for nuclear weapons
was strong and if they did not have nuclear weapons already, it would have them in the
near future. The October 2002 NIE goes on to elaborate on Iraq’s weapons programs and
the threat they posed. The NIE addresses the fact that Iraq has failed to comply with UN
Resolution 687 which was enacted in April 1991, and ordered Iraq to declare or destroy
any WMD as well as cease any further development of WMD in the future.18 The NIE
reports: “Iraq never has fully accounted for major gaps and inconsistencies in its
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Central Intelligence Agency. “National Intelligence Estimate October, 2002:
Iraq’s Weapons of Mass destruction Programs.” (accessed October 19, 2010) 1.
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declarations and has provided no credible proof that it has completely destroyed its
weapons stockpiles and production infrastructure.”19 Furthermore, the NIE reports that
Iraqi security personnel took serious action to try to hide material relating to Iraq’s
weapons program in an attempt to thwart inspections.20 Based on the information
provided by the NIE, one can see that Iraq continually defied the UN Security Council as
well as misled the world in regards to its weapons programs and its nuclear weapons
capabilities ever since the end of the first Gulf War in 1991. From the perspective of the
Bush administration, it is obvious that the United States needed to take some form of
action, whether diplomatic or military, as a means of eliminating Iraq’s potential threat to
U.S. national security.
Iraq’s weapons programs were of great concern to the United States and the rest
of the world ever since the end of the first Gulf War in 1991. Saddam Hussein’s previous
use of chemical weapons made it clear to the United States that he still possessed those
capabilities in 2002. However, the most important aspect that the Bush administration
needed to know about was Iraq’s nuclear weapons capability. This information was
crucial in the sense that it posed the biggest threat to national security. The intelligence
on Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was essential in determining whether or not the
United States should take military action. The NIE is very clear in pointing out that
continued oversight over the years from the UN and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) has not reduced Saddam Hussein’s desire to possess nuclear weapons.21
According to the NIE “Iraq has withheld important details relevant to its nuclear
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program, including procurement logs, technical documents, experimental data,
accounting of materials, and foreign assistance.”22 Furthermore, many intelligence
experts suspected that Iraq was attempting to acquire tens of thousands of high-strength
aluminum tubes.23 This was of major concern to the Bush administration. Although the
aluminum tubes could also be used for conventional weapons, there was the possibility
that they could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program in the development of nuclear
weapons.24 The NIE points out numerous times that the one major thing preventing Iraq
from having nuclear weapons was the possession of fissile material.25 It goes on to say
that Iraq did not have the ability to produce this material indigenously for a long time and
therefore it would most likely try to acquire the weapons-grade fissile material from
somewhere else.26 This raised speculation among the Bush administration that Iraq was
trying to get this material from another country and if Iraq were successful in doing so it
would be very close to developing a nuclear weapon. However, the NIE does not give
any information regarding where Iraq might seek to obtain the enrichment uranium
necessary to complete its nuclear capabilities. The October 2002 NIE also reports that in
order to fund its nuclear program “Baghdad diverts some of the $10 billion worth of
goods now entering Iraq every year for humanitarian needs to support the military and
WMD programs instead.”27 The October 2002 NIE gives substantial evidence pointing
to the existence of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq as well as the development of
nuclear weapons. Although the NIE points out that Iraq has not been able to complete
22
23
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25
26
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the enrichment process of its nuclear program, which happens to be the most difficult
part, the NIE also makes clear Iraq’s potential for nuclear power as well as Saddam
Hussein’s desire for nuclear power illustrated by his tactics of defiance and concealment.
Judging by the content of the NIE, the Bush administration was wise to consider Iraq a
threat to national security and a candidate for preemptive action.
Instead of jumping to conclusions and going straight to war, the Bush
administration wanted to approach the situation with Iraq diplomatically and gain the
support of the rest of the world. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the United
Nations on February 5, 2003, is an example of how the Bush administration attempted to
justify its allegations of Iraq’s potential nuclear threat as well as gain the support of the
United Nations. Powell begins his speech to the UN with Resolution 1441, which was
implemented “…to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.”28 Powell says that
Iraq has failed to comply with Resolution 1441. Powell goes on to say that his purpose
“...is to provide you with additional information, to share with you what the United States
knows about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction…”29 Secretary Powell is adamant in his
speech that Iraq has severely breached Resolution 1441 and that there should be
consequences. Powell makes the case for the existence of biological weapons stating that
Iraq has “…never accounted for all of the biological weapons they admitted they had and
we know they had. They have never accounted for all the organic material used to make
them. And they have not accounted for many of the weapons filled with these agents
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Colin Powell. “A policy of Evasion and Deception.” The Washington Post
(accessed October 19, 2010) 1.
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such as there are 400 bombs.”30 Powell goes on to address nuclear weapons saying that
there is no suggestion that Saddam Hussein has discarded his nuclear weapons program.31
Furthermore, Powell proclaims in his speech that the United States has a decade of
evidence that Saddam Hussein is still trying to get nuclear weapons.32
Given the certainty of Powell’s speech, he makes it clear that Iraq still has WMD
and continues to seek nuclear weapons. Powell proclaims to the UN that “leaving
Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or
years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th world.”33 Powell also presented tape
recordings to the UN with conversations between Iraqi officers about evacuating certain
materials from facilities before weapons inspectors entered the country.34 Powell also
says in his speech that the U.S. has satellite photos showing that banned materials were
moved from Iraqi WMD facilities.35 Given Powell’s confidence in his speech to the UN,
one would have to assume that the United States really did have sufficient evidence to
make such claims. The Bush administration wanted to make its case clear that Saddam
Hussein was a threat to the national security of the United States and the rest of the free
world, especially in the UN. One would have to assume that the Bush administration
made sure that everything that Secretary Powell presented to the UN in his speech was
supported by evidence. The purpose of Powell’s speech was to present the evidence of
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WMD in Iraq and to gain the support of the UN so that when the U.S. did take action it
was not doing so alone.
In another attempt to gain support for action in Iraq, President Bush gave a speech
in Cincinnati on October 7, 2002, outlining the extent of Iraq’s threat to the United States.
President Bush points out the danger of Iraq’s regime saying, “It possesses and produces
chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons.”36 Bush distinguishes
the threat of Iraq from other potential threats proclaiming that “Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction are controlled by a murderous tyrant who has already used chemical weapons
to kill thousands of people. This same tyrant has tried to dominate the Middle East, has
invaded and brutally occupied a small neighbor, has struck other nations without
warning, and holds an unrelenting hostility toward the United States.”37 In his speech,
Bush successfully draws a distinction between the threat of Iraq and the threat of other
nations and he makes it clear that Saddam Hussein is the deciding factor. Bush argues
that the United States should not wait to confront Saddam Hussein because in doing so he
will only grow stronger.38 President Bush also points out in his speech that Iraq is trying
to acquire high-strength aluminum tubes to make gas centrifuges, all for the purpose of
producing enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.39 Bush stressed the need to take
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action: “Facing evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun,
that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”40
President Bush makes a strong argument for why Iraq poses a serious threat to the
United States and why action needs to be taken. By the time Bush gave his speech in
Cincinnati, he was already fairly certain that the United States would have to take
military action. However, he wanted to gain as much support as possible and take
whatever diplomatic measures were necessary before risking American lives. Based on
the evidence that Bush provided in his Cincinnati speech along with Colin Powell’s
speech to the UN, many people felt that Iraq posed a serious threat to the free world
under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. This belief was rooted in the Bush
administration’s assurance that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, and that
it was in the process of developing nuclear weapons, which they could have within a year
once they obtained the weapons grade fissile material if nothing was done. The
allegations of WMD presented to the American people and the rest of the world as
reasoning behind the war were extremely bold statements that the Bush administration
knew it would have to live up to and answer for if WMD were never found.
In retrospect it is hard to fathom how the Bush administration could have come up
with so much intelligence pointing to the existence of WMD in Iraq when none of the
weapons were found after the invasion. The Bush administration seemed certain that
WMD were present in Iraq and that for the sake of national security military intervention
was necessary because Saddam Hussein’s regime was not complying with UN weapons
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inspections. The fact that the Bush administration went to the UN with all of its
intelligence regarding WMD and in the end no weapons were found hurt the
administration’s credibility. While the Bush administration should not have portrayed the
intelligence to be completely factual, it does not change the fact that there was still a
degree of uncertainty in respect to Iraq, and this did pose a threat. Furthermore the Bush
administration chose to invade Iraq based on preemption. It did not want to risk the
possibility of another terrorist or nuclear attack because it did not have conclusive
evidence. The Bush administration knew that it had to act quickly because if it waited
too long Hussein might obtain nuclear weapons.41 If the Bush administration waited, it
could have attained more conclusive intelligence, but by then it might have been too late
and the intelligence would have been irrelevant. Furthermore, the Bush administration
did give the weapons inspectors a chance to find the weapons stockpiles before it took
military action. In March 2003, Hans Blix, the chief weapons inspector, reported to the
UN Security Council that the WMD that were unaccounted for in 1998 were still
unaccounted for.42 These weapons consisted of
…3.9 tons of VX nerve agent; 6,526 aerial chemical bombs; 550 mustard gas
shells; 2,062 tons of Mustard precursors; some 15,000 empty 12-mm chemical
rocket warheads; 8,445 liters of anthrax; growth media that could have produced
3,000-11,000 liters of botulinum toxin, 6,000-16,000 litres of anthrax, up to 5,600
liters of Clostridium perfingens, and a significant quantity of an unknown
bacterial agent; at a minimum 16-30 structural rings for missiles; and at least 15
special warheads.43
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Although there is no mention of nuclear weapons in this list, it is nevertheless an
extensive list of unaccounted for weapons that could kill hundreds of thousands of
people.
The Iraq Survey Group, formed in order to conduct a survey of Iraq’s weapons
programs after the invasion, reported to have uncovered several activities related to
WMD programs going on in Iraq. Originally headed by David Kay, the Iraq Survey
Group discovered a hidden network of laboratories; a prison laboratory complex,
“reference strains” for biological weapons, research on agents linked to biological
weapons, and advanced planning on missiles with ranges up to 1,000 kilometers.44 After
David Kay stepped down, Charles Duelfer was appointed to take over the Iraq Survey
Group. Although Duelfer did not report specific evidence the way that Kay had, Duelfer
also reported his own findings regarding Saddam Hussein’s weapons programs. Duelfer
reported that as UN sanctions became weaker and weaker there was a definite increase in
activities related to the development of WMD, Saddam Hussein never abandoned his
objective to continue producing chemical weapons, two of Saddam Hussein’s goals were
to recover economically and rebuild Iraq’s WMD programs after the first Gulf War, and
Saddam Hussein’s regime intended to resume its WMD program after UN sanctions were
lifted all along.45 However, this list of unaccounted for weapons provided by the
weapons inspectors along with the findings of the Iraq Survey Group were not the
deciding factor for the United States to go to war. “The case for war, in short, did not rest
exclusively on the existence of stockpiles. It derived from a perception of Saddam’s
intentions and capabilities, both existing and potential, and was grounded in the reality of
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Saddam’s prior behavior.”46 Relying on the notion of preemption as a means of national
security, this reasoning is the most logical explanation for why the Bush administration
decided to launch the invasion.
Although Iraq had been a high priority for the Bush administration ever since the
president took office, the administration still needed to weigh all of the evidence and
consider all of its options before it took the nation into a war that would affect the entire
Middle East. The Bush administration may have considered Iraq a threat since 2000, but
it was only after 9/11 that the administration started thinking seriously about taking
action. This can be attributed to the changed mentality of the entire nation after the
terrorist attacks of 9/11. The Bush administration wanted regime change in Iraq, and it
had a lot of reasons to believe that regime change was necessary. In March of 2003 the
Bush administration was influenced by an accumulation of evidence: Saddam Hussein’s
long history of mass murdering, ethnic cleansing, aiding terrorists, and violating UN
resolutions; the view of former officials in the Clinton administration that Saddam
Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction stockpiles; reports from UN inspectors
about unaccounted for weapons; and the fact that intelligence prior to the first Gulf War
had underestimated Iraq’s nuclear capabilities.47 The last thing the Bush administration
wanted to do was make the mistake of underestimating Iraq’s strength and have it
backfire on the United States.
Given the nature of the threat that the Bush administration perceived in Saddam
Hussein’s regime, it might seem like the Bush administration wanted to remove Saddam
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Hussein from power regardless of whether or not he possessed WMD. However, the fact
remains that Saddam Hussein had used chemical weapons in the past and there was
legitimate reason to believe that he still possessed some of these weapons and he intended
on developing nuclear weapons. In the eyes of the Bush administration, this was good
enough to take the appropriate steps toward war. Based on the October 2002 NIE, which
reported that Saddam Hussein still possessed chemical and biological weapons and was
trying to get nuclear weapons, the Bush administration had the evidence it needed to
support its invasion of Iraq.
The Bush administration then set out to gain support both from the UN and the
American people. At the UN the Bush administration sought Resolution 1441 from the
Security Council to justify that “Iraq would face ‘serious consequences’ as a result of
continued violations.”48 On November 8, 2002 Resolution 1441 was passed by a
unanimous vote of 15 to 0.49 This signified a major breakthrough in diplomacy for the
United States. By taking diplomatic measures through the UN the Bush administration
showed that it wanted the disarmament of Iraq above all things and it did not intend to go
to war unless it was the last resort. It was only after the Iraqi regime did not comply with
UN Resolution 1441 that Colin Powell made his speech to the UN arguing that the
United States had factual evidence of WMD in Iraq and therefore the United States was
justified in going into Iraq and removing Saddam Hussein from power.
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President Bush’s speech in Cincinnati along with other speeches made clear to the
American people that there was evidence of WMD in Iraq and due to the previous
behavior of Saddam Hussein, military action seemed likely. With all the certainty
surrounded by Colin Powell’s speech to the UN along with President Bush’s speeches it
was clear to the public at the time that Iraq posed a major threat to the national security of
the United States and therefore military action was necessary. Due to the nature of the
war in Iraq that was conducted under preemption, the intelligence of WMD in Iraq was
crucial and the Bush administration placed a great deal of emphasis on it. Since the Bush
administration was taking the offensive in hopes of preventing further aggression toward
the United States, it had to be sure that its allegations concerning WMD were strongly
supported; otherwise, the administration would have a serious problem if no WMD were
found. If the Bush administration placed the onus of its decision to go to war on the fact
that it was uncertain about Saddam Hussein’s capabilities and it did not want to risk
another tragedy, the sentiment might have been different. However, the Bush
administration weighed its decision to go to war heavily on its certainty that there were
WMD in Iraq and therefore the success or failure on the decision for war relied heavily
on whether or not the WMD were found. One of the only explanations for why no WMD
were found after the invasion was the conclusion that Saddam Hussein had a hidden
weapons program.50 However it was more likely that no WMD were found because the
intelligence was flawed and politicized by the Bush administration.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FAILED INTELLIGENCE AND POLITICIZATION
In March of 2003 the United States embarked on a mission to take over Iraq and
in the process overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein and disarm the country of its
WMD. The process of forming a military strategy for the war took a very long time, and
the process of gaining the support of the American people as well as the rest of the world
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took even longer. Attempts at diplomacy were prolonged by the entire UN resolution
process along with the Bush administration trying to get as much support from the free
world as possible in order to build a respectable coalition. However, this coalition was
formed on the foundation that Saddam Hussein’s regime possessed WMD, a foundation
that the Bush administration supported publicly on numerous accounts. If the American
people along with the rest of the world had not been confident in the accuracy of the
claims of the Bush administration, they likely would not have supported the war in the
same fashion. However, the fact that no WMD were found once the United States
military invaded Iraq left the entire world wondering why no WMD were found. On
January 28, 2004, David Kay, head of the Iraq Survey Group, said that 85 percent of the
work was done and that he didn’t ever think they would find WMD.51 After this, the
Bush administration placed the blame on the Intelligence Community and a failure of
intelligence. The Bush administration proposed an independent bipartisan commission
designed to investigate WMD and intelligence problems.52 The Intelligence Community
argued that it was not a failure of intelligence, but instead it was the way in which the
administration interpreted the intelligence in order to support its objectives. As I will
show, both the Intelligence Community and the Bush administration were at fault for
making such a strong case for the presence of WMD. It is unfortunate that this failure of
the Bush administration and the Intelligence Community could not be seen before the
war, however, the fact remains that the intelligence of WMD in Iraq should have never
been presented to the public as conclusive and the primary reason for why the United
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States needed to take military action. A report by the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, which conducted an investigation into the Intelligence Community’s
assessments of Iraq before the war, depicts how there was a failure of intelligence in
gathering enough conclusive information on the extent of Saddam Hussein’s weapons
programs. Furthermore the investigation by the Iraq Survey Group also shows that our
intelligence on Iraq leading up to the war was not consistent with the true nature of what
weapons were actually in Iraq. The failure of intelligence was not the only problem with
the allegations of WMD in Iraq. The personal account of George Tenet, director of the
CIA during the Clinton and Bush administrations, illustrates how the CIA’s intelligence
was misinterpreted as well as politicized by the Bush administration in order to support
its foreign policy objectives. This is not to say that the United States should not have
waged a war in Iraq. Iraq did pose a threat to the national security of the United States.
The issue is that the Bush administration used insufficient evidence to support its claims
that WMD were present in Iraq when in actuality they were making these claims under
false pretenses. There is no doubt that the United States and its allies were safer after the
invasion of Iraq however it was at the expense of the Bush administration making
inaccurate assumptions to the world supported by failed intelligence.
The Bush administration set out to conduct a war based on preemption for the
sake of national security. Due to the fact that it was not reacting to an imminent threat
but instead trying to prevent and remove a potential threat, the Bush administration relied
heavily on intelligence provided by the CIA that would provide it with the information
needed in order to make a well-informed decision. The October 2002 National
Intelligence Estimate acted as the primary source of this information and was the basis
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under which the Bush administration would make its decisions on Iraq. However, the
October 2002 NIE proved to be inaccurate only after the fact. Furthermore, the Bush
administration’s failure to interpret the intelligence correctly was exposed by George
Tenet’s personal account as well as numerous other accounts of the events leading up to
the 2003 invasion.
In June of 2003 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence conducted an
investigation of the Intelligence Community titled “Report on the U.S. Intelligence
Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq.” The investigation looked into
the prewar intelligence on Iraq’s WMD programs, Iraq’s ties to terrorism, Saddam
Hussein’s threat to the region, and his previous use of WMD against his own people.53
The main objective of the report was to decide whether the judgments made by the
Intelligence Community regarding WMD in Iraq were sound and accurate.54 One of the
conclusions of the report was that “the major key judgments in the NIE, particularly that
Iraq ‘is reconstituting its nuclear program…has chemical and biological weapons,’ either
overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting…”55 The fact
that Iraq tried to deceive UN weapons inspectors for years along with the fact that Iraq
could not account for chemical and biological weapons may have led CIA analysts to
believe that Iraq still had these weapons.56 However this was an assumption on the part
of the analysts due to the fact that they did not have information to prove this for certain.
Another conclusion of the Senate Committee’s report was that the analysts did not make
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clear to policymakers the uncertainties surrounding the NIE.57 The report states: “At the
time the IC drafted and coordinated the NIE on Iraq’s WMD programs in September
2002, most of what intelligence analysts actually ‘knew’ about Iraq’s weapons programs
pre-dated the 1991 Gulf War, leaving them with very little direct knowledge about the
current state of those programs.”58 One of the major problems with the NIE was that
most of the known facts used by the analysts about Iraq’s weapons programs came from
before the first Gulf War, more than a decade before.59 Therefore analysts did not know
as much as they appeared to know. Another conclusion drawn from the report was that
there was an underlying presumption within the Intelligence Community that Iraq had a
growing WMD program.60 This presumption led analysts to infer that certain ambiguous
evidence actually pointed to a WMD program.61 This dynamic is known as “group
think” and is defined as “…examining few alternatives, selective gathering of
information, pressure to conform within the group or withhold criticism, and collective
rationalization.”62 The “group think” dynamic that perpetuated itself throughout the
Intelligence Community proved to be very detrimental to the entire intelligence gathering
process. Everyone was acting under the notion that there were WMD in Iraq and
therefore whatever intelligence analysts collected was automatically assumed to support
this underlying notion. What was worse was that no one was able to stand up and make
the argument that the intelligence was only supporting one side and it was not
considering other possible options. Another problem was that when there was
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information that did not support the WMD claims, analysts chose not to report it. For
example, weapons inspections in November of 2002 did not find any traces of active
WMD programs however analysts did not think this was significant and thus chose not to
report it.63 The fourth conclusion of the report was that the assessments in the NIE were
based on judgments, and the uncertainties surrounding those particular judgments were
never considered.64 While these judgments may have been logical, the fact that they were
treated as truths without ever considering the uncertainty turned out to be a huge problem
and was the main reason why the Intelligence Community concluded that WMD were
actually in Iraq. The fifth conclusion of the report was that managers of the analysts
within the Intelligence Community failed to facilitate the intelligence process in the sense
that they did not challenge assumptions or consider possible alternatives.65 The sixth
conclusion of the report was that the Intelligence Community did not have any additional
sources on WMD programs in Iraq after 1998.66 The fact that there was no real new
information after 1998 highlights a huge failure in the intelligence process. A lot could
have happened between 1998 and 2002 when the NIE was published and the analysts
failed to recognize this giant gap in their intelligence. The seventh conclusion of the
report was that the CIA failed to share certain information and in some cases withheld
information from the rest of the Intelligence Community.67 In so doing the CIA created a
disadvantage for the entire Intelligence Community because no one was on the same
page.

63
64
65
66
67

Ibid, Conclusion 3.
Ibid, Conclusion 4.
Ibid, Conclusion 5.
Ibid, Conclusion 6.
Ibid, Conclusion 7.
34

The Senate Intelligence Committee’s report also examined the Niger uranium
case. There was some intelligence dating to 1991 that Iraq was attempting to acquire
yellowcake uranium from Niger. The attainment of this uranium would have given Iraq
the last ingredient needed to complete its nuclear capabilities. The CIA was not certain
that the exchange of uranium between Iraq and Niger actually happened; however, it did
report that the two countries had been negotiating the shipment for some time.68 The CIA
supposedly had intelligence of a foreign government service saying that Iraq was
attempting to get 500 tons of uranium from Niger.69 In addition, a CIA nuclear analyst
believed that Iraq could have been trying to get uranium from Africa and Niger could
have possibly supplied Iraq with the necessary amount.70 While it was possible for Iraq
to have been trying to get uranium from Niger, the intelligence was not nearly strong
enough to place any level of confidence on the idea. The problem with this intelligence
was that it was included in the NIE under the assumption that there was a good chance it
was true and that Iraq actually was procuring uranium from Niger. However, the only
thing the intelligence supported was that Niger did have uranium and Iraq was trying to
get uranium. There was no intelligence supporting a link between the two countries
however it was alluded to in the NIE as if it were.
The report that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence put together clearly
illustrates how the Intelligence Community improperly carried out the intelligence
gathering process. The report points out the biased approach taken by the Intelligence
Community as well as the exaggeration of certain evidence. The biggest problem of the
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October 2002 NIE was that the CIA set out to put it together with the mindset that there
were WMD in Iraq. This reflected on the entire NIE and as a result no attention was paid
to the alternatives. There was a degree of uncertainty pertaining to Iraq’s WMD
programs and many of the analysts equated this uncertainty to mean that there were
WMD in existence in Iraq. The analysts never considered the fact that while Iraq did
have some weapons program capabilities there actually were not any stockpiles of
weapons. The fact that the NIE takes such a strong stance on the existence of WMD in
Iraq and its nuclear capabilities was reflected in the Bush administration’s decision to go
to war. The Bush administration used a great deal of the information in the NIE to justify
its claims that Saddam Hussein possessed WMD and it presented these claims to the
United Nations and the American people as a reason to take action against Iraq. If the
intelligence process had been carried out with more discretion and if the analysts had
considered all of the possible options, the NIE might not have been as conclusive and
therefore the Bush administration would not have appeared as certain that WMD were in
Iraq and that it posed a major threat to national security.
The findings of the Iraq Survey Group after the invasion also support the claim
that there was an intelligence failure leading up to the war. The Iraq Survey Group Final
Report offers valuable insight into the capabilities of Iraq’s weapons programs, Iraq’s
potential for nuclear weapons, and Saddam Hussein’s intent regarding WMD. The ISG’s
final report makes several claims that Saddam Hussein wanted to remove UN sanctions
as well as rebuild his WMD capabilities. Saddam Hussein believed that WMD were
essential to the survival of his regime and he also felt that he had the right to possess such
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weapons.71 It was almost as if Saddam Hussein was obsessed with obtaining WMD
capabilities. He felt that possession of WMD would be helpful in countering any threat
from Iran or Israel, whom he viewed as primary threats.72 Although Israel is an ally of
the United States, Saddam Hussein did not consider the United States as a direct threat.73
Saddam Hussein definitely intended to rebuild his WMD programs as well as try to lift
UN sanctions.74 However it is unclear for what purpose he intended to do so. Saddam
Hussein would have obviously been very dangerous with WMD and he had used
chemical weapons in the past; however, the ISG found no indication that he wanted to
use WMD against the United States or that he even possessed them following the Gulf
War. It is true that Saddam Hussein did not comply with specific UN resolutions and that
he did make attempts to deceive weapons inspections. However, the ISG states in its
report that it did not find evidence of any WMD stockpiles following the 2003 invasion
but that there is the possibility that some weapons did exist based on interviews and
documents.75
The big question is why was Saddam Hussein being so secretive during the
weapons inspections if he did not have major stockpiles of WMD? One possibility is that
he did have stockpiles and therefore it was necessary to hide them. There is also the
possibility that he didn’t have WMD stockpiles, but may have wanted to make it look like
he did. The reason for this would have been to prevent any kind of attack out of fear that
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Saddam Hussein would use WMD on any aggressors. The ISG makes it clear that
Saddam Hussein desired the possession of WMD for the interests of his regime. There is
uncertainty whether he would have used these weapons against his enemies or simply as
a deterrent. However, the ISG did not find any evidence of the existence of WMD in Iraq
before Operation Iraqi Freedom. Furthermore no evidence was found to support the
claim that Iraq was trying to obtain uranium from another country or even try to produce
uranium indigenously.76 Also the ISG did not find any evidence to support the idea that
Iraq was trying to get aluminum tubes for the purpose of nuclear weapons.77 Instead the
aluminum tubes were most likely for the production of rockets.78 When reading the
ISG’s final report one must take into account that its survey was conducted after
Operation Iraqi Freedom so there is the possibility that any evidence of WMD stockpiles
was destroyed before they could get to it. Nevertheless the ISG conducted an extensive
survey in which they interviewed several members of Saddam Hussein’s regime and
studied numerous documents on Iraq’s weapons programs. Its findings do suggest that
Saddam Hussein did want WMD and that he did have weapons programs. Its findings do
not provide any evidence that Saddam Hussein had chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons following the Gulf War of 1991. These findings show that the intelligence
provided by the Intelligence Community prior to the war was not solid. A large amount
of the intelligence was exaggerated to support existing judgments. Also the Intelligence
Community did not consider the possibility that Saddam Hussein was hiding his weapons
capabilities or lack thereof for the sake of Iraq’s national security, not for use against the
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United States. The Intelligence Community never formally informed the Bush
administration of these possibilities and as a result the intelligence that there were WMD
in Iraq was highly mischaracterized. The failure of intelligence was not the only mistake
made prior to the invasion of Iraq. The blame also falls on the Bush administration for
interpreting the intelligence in a way that would support its objectives and then
presenting it to the public as if it were a fact.
George Tenet played a crucial role in the intelligence process and in the final
decision to go to war by the Bush administration. As Director of the CIA, Tenet was in
direct contact with the Bush administration during the entire period before the war and
during the war as well. Tenet offers keen insight on how the decision process unfolded
and his personal account illustrates how the Bush administration in many ways abused
the intelligence it was provided in order to get its point across about WMD in Iraq. Tenet
recognizes the fact that foreign policy changed after 9/11. The Bush administration used
9/11 as motivation to act against any danger of Iraq’s WMD programs.79 Unfortunately
the costs and benefits of preemptive action were never debated within the
administration.80 This can be seen from the attitudes of those involved in preparing the
U.S. military that sensed very early on the inevitability of the upcoming war.81 Many
critics today believe that the Bush administration was fixing the intelligence around the
policy instead of the other way around. However according to Richard Dearlove, head of
MI-6 in Great Britain, “…the cause for war was more about the politics in the Middle
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East, not WMD, and the intelligence was just being used in an undisciplined manner.”82
It is clear that the Bush administration considered Iraq to be a top priority in terms of
foreign policy. However the way the Bush administration portrayed the war as necessary
because of Saddam Hussein’s WMD was wrong. In 2002 Vice President Dick Cheney
gave a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in which he stated …”there is no doubt
that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction…he is amassing them to use
against our friends, against our allies, and against us…Saddam will acquire nuclear
weapons very soon.”83 Cheney should have never made these statements to the public.
While these statements may have been beliefs of the Bush administration, they were not
facts supported by solid intelligence. In fact, Tenet makes it clear that the CIA never
cleared Cheney’s speech and his statements overstepped the bounds of what the CIA’s
intelligence could support.84 The more reasonable belief held by the CIA was that Iraq
probably could not obtain nuclear weapons until the end of the decade.85 This implies
that Iraq would not have the weapons grade material needed to build a nuclear weapon
for several more years and then it would take at least a year longer to build the weapon
once it had the material.
The case for WMD was clearly not the only reason the Bush administration
wanted to go to war in Iraq. The removal of Saddam Hussein along with a democracy in
the Middle East was both very appealing to the Bush administration. The reason why so
much emphasis was placed on the case for WMD was that it received a great deal of
attention from the public. The imminence of a nuclear threat would encourage action
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above all things. The Bush administration knew that if it could sell the case for WMD in
Iraq, it would gain tremendous support for the war. The October 2002 NIE was created
for this purpose. Tenet, reluctant to carry out the formation of the NIE, knew he had no
choice saying, “…we don’t make policy. Our job is to tell the people who do what we
know and what we think. It’s up to them to decide what to do about it.”86 However a
large portion of the intelligence in the October NIE was taken from previously published
documents because of time constraints.87 So in reality the October 2002 did have some
new intelligence, however, it also regurgitated old intelligence that might not have been
relevant at the time.
Also, the section in the NIE about yellowcake uranium was taken out of context.
The NIE acknowledged the possibility that Saddam Hussein could acquire the
yellowcake from Niger; however, it did not say that this was very likely.88 The Bush
administration only paid attention to the part regarding Niger and made allegations that
there were negotiations for the uranium between the two countries when this in fact was
not very likely at all. President Bush made a huge mistake by addressing the case of
enriched uranium from Niger in his State of the Union Address in January 2003. Bush
declared, “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought
significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”89 Tenet had earlier made it clear that the
statement about uranium from Niger should not be included in any speeches because it
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could not be confirmed.90 Furthermore Ambassador Joseph Wilson went public in a
piece in the New York Times on July 6, 2003 titled “What I Didn’t Find in Africa” saying,
“There was never any evidence of Iraqi uranium purchases from Niger.”91 Ambassador
Wilson had previously spent time in Africa and he was asked by the Bush administration
to go to Niger to confirm whether or not the allegations that Iraq had received yellowcake
uranium from Niger were true. Ambassador Wilson reported back that there was no
evidence to support such allegations. Nevertheless the Bush administration still decided
to include the allegations of uranium from Niger in the President’s State of the Union
address, most likely to make the case for war more convincing to the public. Wilson’s
main point in his piece was that the Bush administration knew it was putting a lie into the
President’s speech and nothing was done about it. After Wilson went public the Bush
administration fired back at Wilson in an attempt to make his statement less credible. For
example, Ari Fleischer, President Bush’s press secretary, told the media that Wilson was
responsible for the Niger government’s denial of the uranium deal saying, “Wouldn’t any
government deny it?”92 Another example came from Clifford May who suggested that
Wilson went public because he was a partisan Democrat.93 The Bush administration also
sought to exploit Wilson’s wife, Valerie Plame, who worked for the CIA as a spy.
Robert Novak wrote a column in the Washington Post on July 14, 2003 saying, “Wilson
never worked for the CIA, but his wife, Valerie Plame, is an agency operative on
weapons of mass destruction. Two senior administration officials told me Wilson’s wife

90

Ibid, 294-295.
Joseph Wilson, The Politics of Truth: Inside the Lies that Led to War and
Betrayed my Wife’s CIA Identity (New York: Carroll & Graff Publishers, 2004) 334.
92
Ibid, 336.
93
Ibid, 337.

91

42

suggested sending him to Niger to investigate the Italian report.”94 There was no benefit
to revealing Plame’s identity other than to intimidate Wilson after he took his case public
and made the Bush administration look bad for including such an outright lie in the
President’s speech. The Bush administration most likely employed these intimidation
tactics to discourage anyone else from going public. The administration obviously had
something to hide.
While the Bush administration used the intelligence on Iraq to its advantage,
Tenet argues that it did not directly influence the intelligence gathering process. The
intelligence itself was flawed and it did not correctly assess the reality of the situation in
Iraq however policymakers did not attempt to influence analysts to report certain things.95
On the other hand, the Bush administration did politicize the intelligence in an attempt to
make it appear more convincing to the public. In doing so, the Bush administration only
used intelligence that would support its arguments about WMD, and it did not inform the
public of other intelligence.
There was a definite process of preparing the intelligence on WMD to be
presented to the public. The Bush administration wanted to make sure it had all the
intelligence possible to present to the public, and it wanted it to be believable. At a
meeting in December, 2002, Tenet and other intelligence officials were supposed to
present information on Iraq’s WMD that was true and that could also be presented to the
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public.96 When this meeting took place everyone in the National Security Council
already believed that chemical and biological weapons were in Saddam Hussein’s arsenal
and he was developing nuclear weapons.97 The purpose of the meeting was only to
decide how to take the case public. In the meeting Tenet discussed the possibility that the
public case could include satellite photos, communications intercepts, and human
intelligence reports to give the public a better understanding.98 Tenet reassured President
Bush that the public case was a “slam dunk.”99 Tenet’s quote was later exaggerated as
the deciding factor for going to war. However, this comment from Tenet came only three
months before the invasion and the Bush administration had already made serious plans
for war. One account portrays Tenet jumping in the air shouting, “It’s a slam dunk case!”
and from that point on the President was convinced.100 This portrayal makes it seem like
Tenet was the deciding factor in the decision to go to war when in actuality this was not
the case at all. Tenet’s “slam dunk” remark may have been dramatized for the sake of
drawing attention away from President Bush. While Tenet did believe that WMD in Iraq
would be an easy case, his comment was interpreted to be the final straw in Bush’s
decision to go to war. His comment was exaggerated in the same way that the
intelligence was exaggerated. Furthermore, after the meeting in which Tenet made this
quote President Bush told the CIA to put together the best information it had on WMD
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into a document.101 This is an example of how the Bush administration only paid
attention to intelligence on the existence of WMD without considering any of the
alternative intelligence. The Bush administration knew it wanted to take action in Iraq
early on in the administration and it had intelligence, according to the administration, of
Saddam Hussein’s WMD programs. The big hurdle for the Bush administration was
making a case to the public that justified war.
The case that the Bush administration made to the public determined whether or
not the United States would go to war. If the United States did not have popular support,
it would have been far more difficult to launch an invasion of Iraq. Due to the fact that it
was a war of preemption, public support was necessary. It was imperative for the Bush
administration to make a strong case for WMD in Iraq if it wanted to take military action.
The Bush administration’s case for WMD was also presented to the public in Colin
Powell’s speech to the UN on February 5, 2003. Powell worked very closely with the
CIA to come up with his speech. While Powell’s speech did end up producing the
desired effect of the Bush administration, a great deal of the information used in his
speech did not hold up. One particular part referenced an Iraqi spy codenamed
CURVEBALL who supposedly revealed information of the locations of certain chemical
and biological weapons laboratories in Iraq.102 Unfortunately the information provided
by CURVEBALL did not pan out and as a result Powell’s speech lost credibility. In
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many ways the CIA did allow bad information to fall into the hands of policymakers and
Tenet acknowledges this fact.103
While Powell was preparing his speech to the UN he realized that human sources
on Iraq’s WMD were scarce and he was influenced a great deal by Saddam Hussein’s
past behavior which entailed the use of WMD in the 1980’s and the concealment of
WMD in the 1990’s.104 As a result the United Nations and the rest of the world were
presented with information that they considered to be factual when in actuality it was
information that the Bush administration believed to be possible. At the same time, the
Bush administration never took the initiative to question the intelligence or possible
alternatives. The administration accepted the intelligence for what it was worth and used
it to its advantage.
When an administration goes to war, it has to make a case for why the war is
justified. The Bush administration had several reasons for why it felt a war in Iraq was
justified. However, it chose to present the case for WMD to the public because it
believed it had the most intelligence to support that case. Furthermore the UN had been
trying to conduct effective weapons inspections for WMD in Iraq for years. There is no
doubt that WMD in Iraq was an issue, but the Bush administration took the issue to
another level by telling the public that there were WMD stockpiles in Iraq because of
solid intelligence. The analysts who put together the October 2002 NIE should not have
been as conclusive in reporting the evidence and Colin Powell should not have made his
case so absolute in his speech to the United Nations.
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It is evident that the Bush administration exaggerated the intelligence on Iraq’s
WMD in order to make its reasoning for war appear more viable. However, the Bush
administration did consider the threat of WMD in Iraq a serious one, otherwise the
invasion forces would not have prepared for the possibility of a chemical or biological
attack.105 The threat was known but the actual extent and danger of the threat is what was
disputed. Up until the October 2002 NIE, the CIA made sure to say that it was possible
for Iraq to have weapons stockpiles.106 The CIA’s stance became more certain only after
the NIE was reported in which the CIA believed there to be a presence of chemical
weapons stockpiles in Iraq.107 Because the 2002 NIE did not contain very much new
information, it is difficult to understand why there was a sudden shift in the stance of the
CIA on WMD in Iraq. Perhaps the CIA and the rest of the Intelligence Community knew
by this time that the Bush administration was set on war and so the CIA reported what it
thought the Bush administration wanted to hear. Another possibility is that the CIA
honestly felt that Iraq posed a threat to national security and that based on the Bush
Doctrine of preemption war was inevitable. This however does not excuse the fact that
certain intelligence such as the October 2002 NIE contained beliefs and possibilities that
were presented as certainties. The underlying problem lies in the manner in which the
Bush administration presented its case to the public. The Bush administration was so
certain about the presence of WMD in Iraq that it led many to believe that Saddam
Hussein really did have WMD and that he intended on using them. Colin Powell’s
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speech to the United Nations, along with speeches from President Bush and Vice
President Cheney, embodies this unwarranted certainty from the Bush administration.
It is unfortunate that most of the failures within the Intelligence Community were
not discovered until after the fact. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s report
illustrates how the October 2002 NIE was not a document that should have been used to
guarantee WMD in Iraq. Sources have shown that the intelligence of yellowcake
uranium from Niger was not solid intelligence. Also, the proposal that aluminum tubes
acquired by Iraq for the development of nuclear weapons was not supported by credible
intelligence either. The only solid intelligence that should have been regarded as reliable
was the assessment that Iraq could potentially have nuclear capabilities in a decade, Iraq
had not adhered to the UN Security Resolutions since the Gulf War, and Saddam Hussein
had engaged in deception in attempts to hide certain things from UN weapons inspectors.
Otherwise there was no solid intelligence of the existence of weapons stockpiles in Iraq.
Even if the intelligence process prior to the war had been conducted correctly with all the
options considered, it is difficult to think that the Bush administration might have made a
different decision. The fault of the Bush administration lies in the fact that it made a case
to the public that was not supported by legitimate intelligence. While the CIA is at fault
for this, the Bush administration must also be held accountable since it did not take an
unbiased approach to assessing the intelligence. Instead of portraying its motive in Iraq
as preemption and the establishment of democracy in the Middle East, the Bush
administration believed it was necessary to make a case for the existence of WMD in
Iraq. In doing so the Bush administration misled the public and made justification for
war under false pretenses.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE BEST INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
The Bush administration viewed Iraq as a foreign policy objective ever since it
took office in 2000 and plans for war were being prepared over a year before the actual
invasion. One cannot assume that the Bush administration would have decided not to
launch Operation Iraqi Freedom unless there was absolute certainty that WMD were
nonexistent in Iraq. This intelligence never existed and so the Bush administration chose
action instead of running the risk of an expanding arsenal of WMD under the hand of a
ruthless dictator. The Bush administration did not want “…the smoking gun to be a
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mushroom cloud.”108 In President Bush’s ultimatum to Iraq before the invasion he made
it clear that the United States intended to confront Saddam Hussein proclaiming “We
meet that threat now, with our Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard and Marines, so that
we do not have to meet it later with armies of firefighters and police and doctors on the
streets of our cities.”109
Preemption arguably was the right decision in terms of United States foreign
policy towards Iraq. Given the level of uncertainty and past actions of the Iraqi regime,
the Bush administration wanted to err on the side of precaution. In this sense, the war in
Iraq was the right decision. However, in another sense, the intelligence and the course of
events leading up to the 2003 invasion were filled with bad decisions. For the sake of
national security, military intervention was the right decision however the Bush
administration’s attempt to justify the war turned out to be illegitimate. In many ways
there was a failure of intelligence. The October 2002 NIE was put together by analysts
who shared a common view that WMD were present in Iraq. Furthermore the NIE itself
contained several conclusive statements about WMD stockpiles that should have been
reported as judgments instead of facts. Also, the Intelligence Community failed to
recognize possible alternatives. By only concentrating on the existence of WMD
intelligence analysts failed to inform officials of the possibility that there were no WMD.
Because of this the intelligence reported to the Bush administration was not as accurate as
it was made out to be.
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While the Intelligence Community did not report the intelligence on Iraq as
accurately as it should have, the Bush administration also did not take an unbiased
approach to interpreting it. In order to support its motive for war, the Bush
administration engaged in “cherry-picking” and “stovepiping.”110 “Cherry-picking” is a
term used to describe when officials embellish certain intelligence in order to support a
policy and also downplay other intelligence that does not support the policy.111 An
example of this was when the Bush administration made a big deal about the Niger
enrichment uranium case in an attempt to make it seem like Iraq was closer to a nuclear
weapon than it actually was. The Bush administration did this without acknowledging
other intelligence proposing that this was not very likely. “Stovepiping occurs when
specific pieces of raw intelligence are reported directly to officials without putting them
through the entire analyzation process.112 In some cases “stovepiping” may be warranted
however “…when used to justify policies to the public they incorrectly imply the backing
of the intelligence community.”113 An example of “stovepiping” is when the President’s
State of the Union speech included a statement that the United States had evidence that
Iraq obtained uranium from Niger. While there may have been intelligence reported to
the President about this, the statement in the President’s speech was never cleared by the
CIA. While there was a failure of intelligence, it is difficult to know if the intelligence
really mattered in terms of whether or not the Bush administration chose to go to war in
Iraq. President Bush probably would have made the decision even if the intelligence did
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not support claims of WMD due to the fact that Saddam Hussein wanted WMD,
particularly nuclear weapons.114 It is evident that the Bush administration overstated the
intelligence of WMD in Iraq to the public in order to make the threat appear more
imminent than it actually was. While part of the blame falls on the Intelligence
Community, the final call for war came from the Bush administration and for this reason
it bears most of the responsibility for never finding WMD in Iraq.
The war in Iraq must be attributed to preemption instead of a search for WMD
stockpiles. Although the Bush administration portrayed the war in Iraq as a mission to
rid the country of its WMD programs, it was more a mission to protect national security
and establish a democracy in the Middle East. There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein
posed a serious threat to the United States due to his prior actions and his quest for
nuclear weapons. However that threat was made more evident because of a failure of
intelligence and its politicization by the Bush administration. Of course there was some
intelligence that pointed to the possibility of WMD stockpiles in Iraq and going into the
war the Bush administration did expect to find WMD. It was only after the fact that no
WMD were found that the public realized that the Bush administration had misled them.
The Bush administration most likely felt that in order to go to war the case of WMD had
to look strong. While this was wrong in many ways it does not change the fact that the
war in Iraq was a necessary act of preemption in order to protect the national security of
the United States. By implementing the Bush Doctrine after 9/11, this is what President
Bush set out to do. The war in Iraq was not simple by any means and thousands of
Americans lost their lives fighting for their country. However, due to the fact that the
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Iraq war ended in August 2010, it has not been long enough to assess whether or not the
war was successful in the long run. Because the war in Iraq is so recent, most people are
critical of the Bush administration, for not finding any WMD following the invasion,
without thinking about the bigger picture. Time will tell if the removal of a dictator and
the establishment of a democracy in the Middle East was the right decision in terms of
foreign policy. Although the Bush administration may have misled the public in
justifying the war in Iraq, it acted in the best interest of the United States. The failure of
intelligence and politicization by the Bush administration was a big mistake, but it does
not outweigh the decision to take the fight to the enemy and protect the freedom of the
American people.
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